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The paper analyzes a multicountry extension of the Barro model of productive public
expenditure. In the presence of positive infrastructural externalities between countries, the
provision of infrastructure will be inefficiently low if countries do not coordinate. This
provides a role for a supranational body, such as the European Union, to coordinate the
policies of the individual governments. It is shown how intervention by a supranational
body can raise welfare by internalizing the infrastructural externality. Infrastructural
externalities increase the importance of tax policy in the growth process and distribute the
benefits of taxation across countries.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One factor promoting endogenous growth is the supply of public infrastructure
that complements the capital investments of the private sector. The importance of
infrastructure is widely recognized, not least by the European Union (EU), which
pursues an active program to support the investment activities of member states.
The policy problem facing the EU is to ensure that member states undertake an effi-
cient level of infrastructural expenditure that ensures the maximum rate of growth.
The determination of this level has to take into account the full consequences of an
infrastructure project for the EU, not just the direct benefits for the member state un-
dertaking the investment. There are three significant issues that confront this policy
program. First, infrastructural investment has significant spillovers across mem-
ber states. Second, mobility of the tax base results in tax externalities between the
member states, and between the member states and the EU. Third, the EU is faced
with a decision on how to allocate support for infrastructural expenditure across
the different member states. This interacts with the process of revenue-raising,
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and with the extent to which the projects are financed jointly by the EU and
member states.
Economic modeling of the impact of infrastructure on economic growth has
focussed on the Barro (1990) model of public expenditure as a public input and
its extensions [Chen et al. (2005) and Turnovsky (1999)]. This literature has
identified the concept of an optimal level of expenditure, and has highlighted
the deleterious effects of both inadequate and excessive expenditure. These are
important insights, but they do not address the spillover issues that confront
the EU. Infrastructural spillovers between member states can be positive, which
occurs when improvements in infrastructure in one member state raise productivity
in another, or they can be negative if they induce relocation of capital between
member states. In either case, it is important that the consequences of spillovers
be addressed for the role of productive public expenditure to be fully understood.
Ignoring either form of spillover will result in an inefficient level and allocation
of expenditure.
In this paper we construct a multicountry extension of the Barro model of
productive public infrastructure in which the benefits of infrastructure spill over
between countries. The spillover between countries is a form of externality that
results in inefficient investment in infrastructure if countries act independently. If
there are positive infrastructural externalities between countries, then the provision
of infrastructure will be inefficiently low when countries do not coordinate policies.
This gives a role to a supranational body, such as the EU, to act as a coordinator
of the policies of individual governments. The financing of infrastructure in the
Barro model is through a simple tax on output levied at the national level. The
position in the EU is much more complex. Each member state levies national
taxes. Part of the revenue from these taxes is retained by the member states;
the remainder is remitted to and redistributed by the EU. In economic terms,
if there is mobility of the tax base, then there are horizontal tax externalities
between member states and a vertical tax externality between member states
and the EU. These tax externalities have a key role in determining the growth-
maximizing level of expenditure. We model a supranational body that intervenes
by revenue-matching to counter the externality and obtain an increase in welfare.
The infrastructural externality raises the importance of tax relative to a world
without spillovers, because additional public infrastructure in one country can
raise the growth rates in all. This holds if all countries are operating with less than
the optimum level of infrastructure, as they will be in an equilibrium without policy
intervention.
There are two distinct literatures that are related to this paper. The first is on the
role of productive public expenditure in endogenous growth models. An extensive
survey of the literature that has developed since Barro (1990) is provided by Irmen
and Kuehnel (2009). One key result of the literature, which we exploit below, is
that when public expenditure is a flow variable the economy will immediately
settle onto a balanced growth path. In contrast, Futagami et al. (1993) analyze
a model with public capital as a stock variable. In this case, the economy has
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transitional dynamics before reaching the balanced growth path. Optimal fiscal
policy with a stock variable when the government expenditures are divided be-
tween capital and current expenditures is characterized in Gomez (2004) and in
Tsoukis and Miller (2003). Marrero (2008) relates the level of investment in public
capital to characteristics of the economy, including the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. A broader range of fiscal policies are studied in Turnovsky (2004) in
a similar model. The central conclusion is that the transition period can be very
lengthy, so policy can have a significant welfare effect along the transition path.
We choose to represent the public good as a flow variable, so we do not need to
address these transition issues.1 The common feature of the models just described
is that they involve a single country, whereas our model involves infrastructural
spillovers between countries. Iwamoto and Shibata (2008) also consider multiple
countries with worldwide externalities. They show that the externalities provide a
mechanism for equalizing growth rates across countries even if capital tax rates
differ. The same result emerges when we introduce perfectly mobile capital.
The fact that the benefits of public expenditure spill over between countries
gives a motive for countries to coordinate tax policies. This links our analysis to
the literature on fiscal federalism. The static literature on fiscal federalism focuses
on the benefits of decentralizing public good provision and the consequences of
mobility for tax competition [see, for example, Boadway and Shah (2009)]. There
is also a limited literature on fiscal federalism in growth settings. Brueckner (2006)
shows how the tailoring of public good levels to local demand can promote growth
in an overlapping-generations economy. The effect of mobility as a constraint on
excessive taxation is studied by Rauscher (2005), but the results are ambiguous and
depend on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This analysis is extended
by Becker and Rauscher (2007) to a model with costly adjustment of capital. In
this case there may be no balanced growth path. Hatfield (2006) contrasts the
tax rate choices of decentralized and centralized governments. It is shown that a
decentralized government chooses a tax rate that maximizes the growth rate, but
underprovides public goods.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes a basic version of the
endogenous growth model with a productive public input. Section 3 studies the role
of a supranational body in coordinating the choices of individual countries when
there is an infrastructural externality. The analysis is extended to accommodate
the mobility of private capital in Section 4. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
2. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Endogenous growth can occur when capital and labor are augmented by additional
inputs in a production function that otherwise has nonincreasing returns to scale.
One interesting case for understanding the link between government policy and
growth is when the additional input is a public good or public infrastructure
financed by taxation. The need for public infrastructure to support private capital in
production provides a positive role for public expenditure and a direct mechanism
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through which policy can affect growth. The Barro (1990) model of productive
public expenditure was the first to investigate the role of public infrastructure and
permitted an analysis of the optimal level of public expenditure in an endogenous
growth model.
With public infrastructure, the production function for the representative firm
at time t takes the form
Yt = AL1−αt Kαt G1−αt , (1)
where A is a positive constant and Gt is the quantity of public infrastructure. The
form of this production function ensures that there are constant returns to scale
in labor, Lt , and private capital, Kt , for the firm given a fixed level of public
infrastructure. Although returns to private capital are decreasing as the level of
capital is increased for fixed levels of labor and public input, there are constant
returns to scale in public input and private capital together. For a fixed level
of Lt , this property of constant returns to scale in the other two inputs permits
endogenous growth to occur.
We assume that government spending is funded from a tax levied on the private
capital input. We further assume that public investment is a pure public good that
fully depreciates after one period, so that Gt is a flow variable. This allows us to
focus on the balanced growth path equilibrium. The government runs a balanced
budget in every period, so, with tax rate τ, the level of public infrastructure in
period t is
Gt = τKt . (2)
The firm belongs to a representative infinitely lived household whose preferences
are from this point on described by an instantaneous utility function, Ut = ln(Ct ).
The household chooses the time path of the capital stock {Kt } to maximize the
infinite discounted stream of utility,
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(Ct ), (3)
subject to the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints
Yt = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δK)Kt + τKt , (4)
where δK ≥ 0 is the rate of depreciation of private capital. The initial capital, K0,
is fixed and the household treats the tax rate, τ , and the sequence of government
infrastructure, {Gt }, as parametric. Assuming that Lt is constant and setting Lt =
1, the objective of the household is
max
{Kt }∞t=1
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln
[
AKαt G
1−α
t − Kt+1 + (1 − δK − τ)Kt
]
. (5)
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Assuming an interior solution exists, the necessary conditions for the choice of
{Kt }∞t=0 can be solved to give
γt ≡ Ct
Ct−1
= β
[
αA
(
Gt
Kt
)1−α
+ 1 − δK − τ
]
− 1, t = 1, 2, . . . . (6)
The sequence {γt } in (6) determines the rate of growth of consumption for the
household in each period t implied by the chosen time path of the capital stock.
These conditions summarize the behavior of the private sector in the model.
The government chooses the tax rate, τ, to maximize U, taking into account
the effect on the decision of the household. The objective of the government is
max
{τ }
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(Ct ),
subject to (2) and (6). Substituting from (2) into (6), it follows that
γt = β[αAτ 1−α + 1 − δK − τ ] − 1 ≡ γ, t = 1, 2, . . . . (7)
so the constant tax rate implies that the economy will be on a balanced growth
path. Using the balanced growth path, the government objective can be written
max
{τ }
U = 1
1 − β
[
ln(K0) + ln(Aτ 1−α − γ − δK − τ) + β1 − β ln(1 + γ )
]
.
(8)
The interior solution for the welfare-maximizing tax rate, τw, along the balanced
growth path is
β
1 − β
1
1 + γ
dγ
dτ
+ 1
Aτ 1−αw − γ − δK − τw
[
(1 − α)Aτ−αw − 1 −
dγ
dτ
]
= 0, (9)
where γ determined by (7).
The tax rate identified in (9) maximizes welfare. This tax rate does not maximize
the rate of growth. From (7), the growth-maximizing tax rate is given by
τm = [α(1 − α)A]1/α.
It is helpful to illustrate the nature of the solution for comparison with later results.
We do this by calibrating the model and simulating the balanced growth path. For
the model’s parameters, we employ values that are broadly consistent with the
calibration of business cycle and growth models; see, for example, Cooley and
Prescott (1995). It can be seen in Figure 1 that (9) intersects (7) to the right
of the maximum achievable growth rate, given the behavior of the household.
The welfare-maximizing tax rate is given by τw = 0.197 and the growth rate
by γw = 0.018. The values for the growth-maximizing policy are τm = 0.153
and γm = 0.021. It should be noted that neither of these policies achieves the
first-best outcome for the economy, because the tax on capital is distortionary.
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FIGURE 1. Single-country parameters: α = 0.5, β = 0.9, A = 0.5, δK = 0.15.
The decentralized outcome is inefficient, because the households, when making a
decision on the level of private capital, do not internalize the externality associated
with the provision of public capital. The source of inefficiency is the difference
between the social marginal return on private capital and the after-tax private
marginal product of capital. This inefficient choice of the household, in its turn,
constrains the government in the choice of the tax rate.
3. INFRASTRUCTURAL SPILLOVERS
This section extends the model to a two-country economy in which production
benefits from positive spillovers created by global infrastructure. The central ob-
servation is that independent optimization by countries does not internalize the
externality resulting from the infrastructural spillover. This provides a role for a
supranational body to coordinate the decisions of individual countries in order
to secure an increase in welfare. We interpret the role of this central body as
performing the function of the EU: it claims a share of the tax revenue of each
country and then redistributes funds among countries.
We assume that there are two countries; one is called the “home” country and
the other the “foreign” country. At time t, the level of output in the home country
is given by
Yt = AKαt
(
G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t
)1−α
. (10)
The measure of global infrastructure at time t , t , is defined as the total public
investment in infrastructure, t = Gt + Gt , where Gt is the public investment in
infrastructure in the foreign country. The infrastructural externality is generated
by the inclusion of the term Gt . The interpretation is that both infrastructure within
a country [the term involving Gt in (10)] and the total level of infrastructure (the
term involving t ) are relevant. The production function in the foreign country is
defined in the same way, and we assume that the parameters α and ρ are the same
for both countries.
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Extending (6), the necessary condition for the choice of the capital stock gives
the following expression:
Ct
Ct−1
≡ 1 + γt = β
⎡
⎣αA(Gt
Kt
)1−α (
1 + Gt
Gt
)ρ(1−α)
+ 1 − δK − τ
⎤
⎦ . (11)
Using (11) and the convention that γ0 = 0, the objective of the government in the
home country can be written as
max
{τ }
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln
(
ti=0 [1 + γi] C0
)
,
or, after some manipulation,
max
{τ }
U = 1
1 − β
[
ln(C0) +
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(1 + γi)
]
. (12)
The governments operate subject to the budget constraints Gt = τKt and Gt =
τKt , so the optimization in (12) is subject to the constraint
γt = β
⎡
⎣αAτ 1−α
(
1 + τKt
τKt
)ρ(1−α)
+ 1 − δK − τ
⎤
⎦− 1, (13)
with τ taken as given, and C0 determined simultaneously by
C0 =
⎡
⎣Aτ 1−α
(
1 + τK0
τK0
)ρ(1−α)
− (γ1 + δK + τ)
⎤
⎦K0
and (13). The values of Kt and Kt are determined as the outcome of consumer
optimization. Similar expressions apply to the foreign country.
When the governments do not coordinate their choices, each maximizes the
welfare of its representative household, ignoring the welfare impact on the other
country. The Nash equilibrium choice of tax rates is therefore determined by
1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γt
∂γt
∂τ
= 0, (14)
1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γ t
∂γ t
∂τ
= 0. (15)
When the two governments coordinate their choice of policies, the tax rates are
chosen simultaneously to maximize the sum of the welfare levels of their repre-
sentative households, taking into account the spillover effects. The coordinated
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optimization still takes into account the fact that the households choose the paths
of capital and these conditions remain the same as in the equilibrium without
coordination. The objective for the coordinated choice of policy is defined as
max
{τ,τ }∞t=0
U + U,
where now the first-order conditions involve
1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+ 1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γt
∂γt
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γt
∂γ t
∂τ
= 0, (16)
1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+ 1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γ t
∂γt
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γ t
∂γ t
∂τ
= 0. (17)
A comparison of (16) and (17) with (14) and (15) illustrates the effect of the
externalities in the model. With uncoordinated optimization, each government
ignores the effect that its choice of tax rate has upon welfare in the other country.
These effects operate through the interaction of the households and directly through
the infrastructural spillover. These effects are internalized in the coordinated case,
so the two outcomes will differ. The simulation below explores the manner in
which they differ.
Now consider the possibility of intervention by a supranational central body
with redistribution of tax revenues that are used to finance the public input into
production. The interaction between the central body and the national government
is modeled as the following multistage game. In the first stage, the central body
announces what share of the tax revenues will be collected for the centralized
fund from each national government. In the second stage, the governments choose
optimal tax rates. In the third stage, the central body announces how the centralized
fund will be divided between the two countries. Finally, investments are made
and production takes place. There is no coordination between the two national
governments at any stage.
The central government takes a fraction θ of the home government revenue and
a fraction θ of the foreign government revenue. After the tax (public investment)
decisions are made in each country, it returns fraction µ of the total collected
revenues to the home country and fraction 1 − µ to the foreign country. With this
system, the budget constraint in the home country is
Gt = (1 − θ)τKt + µt, (18)
where t = θτKt + θτKt . Hence, along the balanced growth path,
Gt =
[
(1 − θ + θµ)τ + θµτ Kt
Kt
]
Kt = ϒtKt ,
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and, similarly,
Gt =
[
(1 − θ + θ (1 − µ))τ + θ(1 − µ)τ Kt
Kt
]
Kt = ϒtKt .
The optimization problems for the households in the home and foreign countries
do not change, because they take the government policy variables as given. The
optimization problem of the home country government becomes
max
{τ }
U = 1
1 − β
[
ln(C0) +
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(1 + γt )
]
,
where
γt = β
⎡
⎣αAϒ1−αt
(
1 + Gt
ϒtKt
)ρ(1−α)
+ 1 − δK − τ
⎤
⎦− 1,
with the tax rate τ and the policy {µ, θ} taken as given. The first-order condition
becomes
1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γt
[
∂γt
∂ϒt
∂ϒt
∂τ
+ ∂γt
∂τ
]
= 0.
Similarly for the foreign country
1
C0
∂C0
∂τ
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1 + γ t
[
∂γ t
∂ϒt
∂ϒt
∂τ
+ ∂γ t
∂τ
]
= 0.
We now employ a simulation analysis to compare the solutions that emerge for
the three equilibrium concepts. The aim of the simulation is to contrast the uncoor-
dinated and the coordinated equilibria and to investigate what can be achieved by
intervention. In interpreting the results, it should be observed that there are three
potential sources of inefficiency. First, the household in each country chooses a
time path for capital given the tax policy. Both households ignore any externalities
arising from their choices. Second, the governments can only indirectly influence
the choices of the households through the choice of a tax rate. The tax on capital
distorts the intertemporal consumption choice. Third, when the governments do
not coordinate, they ignore the positive externality from infrastructural spillovers.
Coordinating the tax choices of the governments addresses only the third source
of inefficiency, so coordination alone will not achieve a first-best outcome.
The simulation adopts the parameter values β = 0.9, ρ = 0.5, α = 0.65,
δK = 0.15, A = A = 1.3, and K0 = K0 = 2. Because the parameters are
identical for both countries, the equilibrium for the model will be a balanced
growth path with the same rate of growth in both countries. The symmetric equi-
librium without coordination between countries is illustrated in Figure 2. The
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FIGURE 2. Without coordination.
FIGURE 3. Equilibrium with coordination.
equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the two curves determined by (11) and
(14). At the equilibrium τn = 0.1944, γn = 0.0740 and Un = 4.4693. As in
the single-country case, the chosen tax rate does not maximize the growth rate.
(The growth-maximizing tax rate is τg = 0.1850, resulting in γg = 0.0741 and
Ug = 4.3197.) We now proceed to show that this outcome does not maximize
welfare either. This is a consequence of the fact that in this equilibrium all three
sources of inefficiency are present.
Figure 3 displays the equilibrium with coordinated policy choice for the same
values of the model parameters. It can be seen that both the tax rate and the growth
rate are higher than in the case without coordination. The values in this case are
τc = 0.2329, γc = 0.0710, and Uc = 4.6026. The coordination ensures that the
infrastructural externality between the governments is internalized, so the third
source of inefficiency is removed. The internalization of the externality provides
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TABLE 1. Effect of intervention
θ τs γs Us
−1.5 0.283 0.0623 4.344
−1.3 0.271 0.0674 4.448
−1.1 0.260 0.0670 4.528
−0.9 0.247 0.0689 4.579
−0.7 0.236 0.0706 4.602
−0.5 0.224 0.0720 4.593
−0.3 0.212 0.0731 4.550
−0.1 0.200 0.0738 4.469
0 0.194 0.074 4.414
0.1 0.188 0.0741 4.349
the incentive to set a higher tax rate. The growth rate and the welfare level are
increased by coordination to the maximum level possible given the financing of
infrastructure through a distortionary capital tax.
Table 1 details the effect of intervention for a range of values of θ . Because
the countries are symmetric, the optimal value of µ = 0.5. The maximum growth
rate is achieved by θ = 0.15, but this value does not coincide with the value of
θ = −0.66 that delivers maximum welfare, U = Uc, with τ = τc and γ = γc.
Observe, though, that the value of θ is negative, which represents the central body
matching the tax revenues of the individual countries. This is not surprising. We
have shown that the equilibrium tax rates are too low in the absence of coordination,
because the infrastructural spillover causes a positive externality. Intervention by
the central body is needed to raise the tax rates, and this is achieved by a process of
revenue-matching. The central body finances this revenue-matching by claiming
back revenues (through µ) once the tax rates have been determined.
4. CAPITAL MOBILITY
A central feature of the EU single market is the free mobility of capital between
member states. The literature on tax competition has demonstrated how capital
mobility results in inefficiently low tax rates because of the tax externality linking
countries. We now wish to investigate the consequences for growth when capital
mobility interacts with the infrastructural spillovers that we have been considering.
To do this, we assume that capital is perfectly mobile and can be reallocated
between countries costlessly. We also assume that capital is taxed in the country
where it is employed. Each consumer will therefore choose to invest in the country
where the after-tax return on capital is higher. This imposes an arbitrage condition
on the return to capital, so in equilibrium the after-tax return on capital is equalized
between countries.
Let kt denote the stock of capital owned by the “home” consumer, kht the
investment in the home country, and kft the investment in the foreign country.
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Clearly, kt = kht + kft . The variables kt , k
h
t , and k
f
t are defined in the same way.
Thus the quantity of capital employed in production in the home country at time
t is
Kt = kht + k
h
t . (19)
Similarly, for the foreign country
Kt = kft + kft . (20)
From (10) and profit maximization, the rental rate of capital in the home country
is given by
rt = αA
[
G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t
kht + kht
]1−α
− τ
and in the foreign country by
rt = αA
[
G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t
k
f
t + kft
]1−α
− τ .
Because capital is internationally mobile, the arbitrage condition requires that the
rental rates be equalized:
αA
[
G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t
kht + kht
]1−α
− τ = αA
[
G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t
kt + kt − kht − kht
]1−α
− τ .
This arbitrage condition determines kht + k
h
t given kt + kt , and hence the world
return on capital,
Rt = Rt(kt + kt ). (21)
The wage rate in the home country is given by
wt = [1 − α] A
[
kht + k
h
t
]α[
G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t
]1−α = Wt(kt + kt ), (22)
and in the foreign country by
wt = [1 − α]A[kft + kft ]α[G
1−ρ
t 
ρ
t ]1−α = Wt(kt + kt ). (23)
The decision problem of the home consumer is to choose the time path of
capital holdings {kt } taking as given the prices, {wt, Rt }, and the tax rates, {τ, τ }.
Initial capital holdings, {k0, k0}, are fixed. The arbitrage condition implies that
the division of capital between countries does not matter in the intertemporal
optimization, so the home consumer solves
max
{kt }
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln[wt + Rtkt + (1 − δK)kt − kt+1]
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subject to the budget constraint
Ct = wt + Rtkt + (1 − δK)kt − kt+1.
The sequence of first-order conditions for the optimization is
− 1
Ct−1
+ β
Ct
(1 − δK + Rt) = 0, t = 1, 2, . . . .
Using the definition γt ≡ Ct/Ct−1, we write these conditions as
γt = β[1 − δK + Rt ] − 1, t = 1, 2, . . . . (24)
The consequence of capital mobility is immediately evident from (24). The arbi-
trage condition ensures that both consumers face the same rental rate for capital,
Rt , so the right-hand side of (24) is not country-dependent. Hence, the growth
rate of consumption must be the same in both countries at every time, t : γt = γ t ,
t = 1, 2, . . . . This consequence of perfect mobility has been observed previously
by Razin and Yuen (1997). Similar issues have also been addressed by Bianconi
and Turnovsky (1997), but in a model that does not have public infrastructure.
Moving to the first stage, the home and foreign tax rates are determined simul-
taneously in the Nash equilibrium between home and foreign governments. The
home government solves
max
{τ }
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(Ct )
subject to the balanced budget constraint
Gt = τKt (25)
and (21)–(24). The home government also recognizes that the foreign government
runs a balanced budget,
Gt = τKt , (26)
but treats τ as fixed when optimizing. The corresponding equations apply for the
foreign consumer and foreign government.
The constancy of τ and τ implies that the solution of (24) (and the foreign
equivalent) will be a balanced growth path with an intertemporally constant world
rental rate for capital. We denote the growth rate by γ and the rental rate by R
and proceed to determine the dependence of these upon the tax rates. The home
government’s objective is to solve
max
{τ }
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln[C0(1 + γ )t ] = 11 − β ln(C0) +
β
(1 − β)2 ln(1 + γ ),
where
γ = β [1 − δK + R] − 1, (27)
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and the world return on capital is determined from the arbitrage condition. On the
balanced growth path kt = (1 + γ )tk0, kt = (1 + γ )tk0, etc., so the arbitrage
condition can be rewritten as
R = αAτ 1−α
[
1 + τ
τ
k0 + k0 − K0
K0
]1−α
− τ
= αAτ 1−α
[
1 + τ
τ
K0
k0 + k0 − K0
]1−α
− τ . (28)
Given the technology parameters and the initial holdings of capital k0 + k0, this
equation determines K0 and R as a function of just τ and τ . All that remains is
to evaluate C0, which then completely identifies welfare as a function of the tax
rates.
We have
Ct = wt + Rkt + (1 − δK)kt − kt+1
= (1 − α) Yt
Kt
Kt + α Yt
Kt
kt − (γ + δK + τ)kt .
On the balanced growth path (27) implies
Yt
Kt
= 1
α
(
1 + γ
β
− 1 + δK + τ
)
.
Therefore,
C0 = 1
α
(
1 + γ
β
− 1 + δK + τ
)
[(1 − α)K0 + αk0] − (γ + δK + τ)k0,
where
γ = −1 + β
[
1 − δK − τ + αAτ 1−α
(
1 + τ
τ
K0
k0 + k0 − K0
)ρ(1−α)]
.
The first-order condition for the home government’s optimization problem when
there is no coordination can now be written as
dU
dτ
= 1
1 − β
1
C0
[
∂C0
∂τ
+ ∂C0
∂γ
∂γ
∂τ
+ ∂C0
∂K0
∂K0
∂τ
]
+ β
(1 − β)2
1
1 + γ
[
∂γ
∂τ
+ ∂γ
∂K0
∂K0
∂τ
]
= 0,
where ∂K0/∂τ is found by taking the total differential of the arbitrage condi-
tion (28). The pair of Nash equilibrium taxes is found by solving this equation
simultaneously with the analogous equation for the foreign government.
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TABLE 2. Equilibrium with mobile capital
Without coordination
τn γn Un
0.162 0.0732 3.901
With coordination
τc γc Uc
0.2329 0.0710 4.6026
With coordination the two governments choose the two tax rates to maximize
the sum of welfare levels,
d(U + U)
dτ
= 0,
d(U + U)
dτ
= 0.
With intervention of a supranational body, in the form of redistribution of tax
revenues, as in the situation with immobile capital considered in the previous
section, the tax rates in the government budget constraints are replaced by the
effective tax rates
Gt = ϒKt,
where ϒ ≡ (1 − θ + θµ)τ + θµτ Kt
Kt
.
The results of simulating the model with our standard parameter values are
summarized in Table 2. Without coordination the tax rate is below the rate with
immobile capital, which is a consequence of the tax competition induced by the
mobility of capital. As a result, the growth rate and the welfare level are both
smaller than those achieved with immobile capital. Coordination between the
countries succeeds in internalizing the externality arising from the mobility of
capital and achieves exactly the same outcome as in the economy with immobile
capital.
Table 3 details the outcome obtained with a supranational body redistributing
tax revenues between governments. The redistribution policy achieves the coor-
dinated outcome when θ = −1.55. The supranational body is therefore able to
internalize the externality from capital mobility and address the externality from
the infrastructural spillover. To achieve this the degree of intervention, as measured
by the value of the revenue-matching parameter θ , has to be greater with mobile
capital than with immobile capital.
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TABLE 3. Coordination with capital mobility
θ τs γs Us
−1.7 0.286 0.0615 4.308
−1.5 0.225 0.0719 4.595
−1.3 0.202 0.0737 4.489
−1.1 0.190 0.0741 4.362
−0.9 0.181 0.0741 4.249
−0.7 0.175 0.0740 4.150
−0.5 0.170 0.0738 4.066
−0.3 0.166 0.0736 3.993
−0.1 0.163 0.0733 3.930
0 0.162 0.0732 3.501
0.1 0.161 0.0731 3.874
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed economies in which public sector expenditure is productive and
there are spillovers of the benefit of public infrastructure between countries. An
increase in infrastructure in one country raises the growth rate in all countries,
which creates an externality between countries. If the choices of individual coun-
tries are not coordinated, then the externality effect will result in an inefficient
choice of policy and the resulting growth rate will not be welfare-maximizing.
Capital mobility creates a second externality, and the inefficiency is made worse
through tax competition.
The policy implications of our analysis are that although public expenditure
can assist growth, there is no guarantee that the optimal rate of growth will be
achieved. The design of the public expenditure program has to take into ac-
count the infrastructural spillovers between countries and the mobility of the
tax base. A coordinating body, such as the EU, has a role to play in attain-
ing a more efficient level of taxation and expenditure on public infrastructure.
This role involves inducing individual countries to raise tax rates through rev-
enue matching, which raises the overall level of expenditure on infrastructure.
However, this intervention will not achieve the first best if the tax instrument is
distortionary.
It can be argued that empirical data show only a weak relationship between
taxation and economic growth [see Myles (2007) for a survey of the literature].
Both capital mobility and infrastructural externalities have the effect of reducing
growth differentials between countries (and completely eliminating the differential
when capital is perfectly mobile). These effects will not be apparent in cross-
country comparisons taken at one point, which may help explain the lack of a
relationship in the data.
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NOTE
1. The alternative of the public good as a stock is modeled in Hashimzade and Myles (2009), but
the paper contrasts balanced growth paths, so it does not consider transition issues.
REFERENCES
Barro, Robert J. (1990) Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of
Political Economy 98, S103–S125.
Becker, Daniel and Michael Rauscher (2007) Fiscal Competition in Space and Time: An Endogenous-
Growth Approach. CESifo Working Paper 2048.
Bianconi, Marcelo and Stephen J. Turnovsky (1997) International effects of government expenditure
in interdependent economies. Canadian Journal of Economics 30, 57–84.
Boadway, Robin and Anwar Shah (2009) Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practice of Multi-Order
Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Brueckner, Jan K. (2006) Fiscal federalism and economic growth. Journal of Public Economics 90,
2107–2120.
Chen, Jhy-hwa, Jhy-yuan Shieh, Ching-chong Lai, and Juin-jen Chang (2005) Productive public
expenditure and imperfect competition with endogenous price markup. Oxford Economic Papers
47, 522–544.
Cooley, Thomas F. and Edward C. Prescott (1995) Economic growth and business cycles. In Thomas
F. Cooley (ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, pp. 1–38. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Futagami, Koichi, Yuichi Morita, and Akihisa Shibata (1993) Dynamic analysis of an endogenous
growth model with public capital. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, 607–625.
Gomez, Manuel A. (2004) Optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy with public capital. Macro-
economic Dynamics 8, 419–435.
Hashimzade, Nigar and Gareth D. Myles (2009) Growth and Public Infrastructure. Economics and
Management Discussion Papers 2009-03, Henley Business School, University of Reading.
Hatfield, John W. (2006) Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth. Research Papers 1929, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University.
Irmen, Andreas and Johanna Kuehnel (2009) Productive government expenditure and economic
growth. Journal of Economic Surveys 23, 692–733.
Iwamoto, Yasushi and Akihisa Shibata (2008) International and intergenerational aspects of capital
income taxation in an endogenously growing world economy. Review of International Economics
16, 383–399.
Marrero, Gustavo A. (2008) Revisiting the optimal stationary public investment policy in endogenous
growth economies. Macroeconomic Dynamics 12, 172–194.
Myles, Gareth D. (2007) Economic Growth and the Role of Taxation. OECD.
Rauscher, Michael (2005) Economic growth and tax-competing leviathans. International Tax and
Public Finance 12, 457–474.
Razin, Assaf and Chi-Wa Yuen (1997) Factor mobility and income growth: two convergence hypothe-
ses. Review of Development Economics 1, 171–190.
Tsoukis, Chris and Nigel J. Miller (2003) Public services and endogenous growth. Journal of Policy
Modeling 25, 297–307.
Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1999) Productive government expenditure in a stochastically growing economy.
Macroeconomic Dynamics 3, 544–570.
Turnovsky, Stephen J. (2004) The transitional dynamics of fiscal policy: Long-run capital accumulation
and growth. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36, 883–910.
